Introduction
As any student of post-war reconstruction will no doubt be aware, the term 'utopian' has become something of a dirty phrase amongst historians of this period. Amongst those who have sought to condemn the planning profession, it has tended to be used derogatorily to disparage what is seen as the misguided naivety and idealism of the period, with post-war planners harshly depicted as deluded idealists and 'utopians unwilling to engage with reality'.2 By contrast, those historians who have sought to challenge this narrative and paint a more positive picture of the planning professions in the 1940s have actively tried to steer as far clear of the concept of 'utopia' as possible. Instead, they have gone to great lengths to highlight the pragmatic, practical and mundane features of the reconstruction plans and proposals put forward at this time, emphasizing the fact that post-war planning was constrained by government legislation and portraying post-war planners as 'socially humane', down-to-earth workers rather than visionary idealists.3
Of course, a large part of the problem in this polarized debate is the fact that both sides have adopted a fairly narrow and limited notion of what a 'utopia' entails. Indeed, despite their differences of opinion over planning issues, they both seem to be unified in viewing utopianism in an overwhelmingly negative light; treating utopias as little more than naive fantasies about other worlds that are, at best, delusionary and escapist: pleasant, but ultimately pointless, amusements. 4 As a result, there has developed what Stefan Muthesius has described as a 'utopia versus reality dichotomy'. 5 This is unfortunate for two reasons.
First, it deprives the idea of 'utopia' of any critical value as an analytical concept; transforming what should be a critically engaging notion into little more than a disingenuous rebuke. 6 Second, it overlooks and disregards the manner in which utopian projectionsrealizable or not -can function as potent aspirational projections through which the desires and ambitions of different social groups can be expressed. 7 This article provides a counterweight to these arguments by restoring the concept of 'utopianism' to the history of planning in the post-war period. Adopting a three-pronged approach that builds on the work of utopian theorists such as Ruth Levitas and Frederic Jameson, it analyses the content, the form and the function of the reconstruction proposals that were put forward by the planning professions in Britain at this time so as to ascertain the extent to which there was any sort of 'utopian impulse' inherent in the planning professions at this time. 8 Ultimately, what it shows is that there was indeed a strong utopian desire amongst post-war planners to work towards and, ultimately, achieve a different, better way of life. Buttressing this optimism, however, was a hard-headed realism about the limits of the planning profession's capabilities and an awareness of the need to solve the planning problems of the day; showing how, in this instance at least, the 'utopian impulse' was able to be channelled into a vision of the future that was at once both idealistic and pragmatic.
The utopian impulse
Part of the problem about writing on the subject of utopianism is that a great deal of confusion still abounds as to what exactly a 'utopia' is. Colloquially, a 'utopia' is still commonly understood to be an idealistic, good, but fictitious, non-existent and, hence, impossible society.9 It is also often assumed to be rigid in terms of its structure and fixed in respect of its goals. As a result, the focus generally tends to fall on the content (and viability) of the visions that have been projected by utopianist thinkers, rather than the form that these projections have taken or the functions that they have served.10 Moreover, there has in the past also been a tendency to denigrate utopianism by equating it with totalitarianism, as Frederic Jameson has noted: Utopia had become a synonym for Stalinism and had come to designate a program which neglected human frailty and original sin, and betrayed a will to uniformity and the ideal purity of a perfect system that always had to be imposed by force on its imperfect and reluctant subjects.11
In recent years, however, there has been a noticeable shift in the field of utopian studies from focusing solely on the utopian projections themselves to thinking more critically about the manner in which utopias are created and the functions that they can serve. Ruth Levitas, for instance, has emphasized the sociological aspects of utopianism, arguing that utopias should be seen as 'the expression of the desire for a better way of being' and suggesting that 'utopianism, in the sense of visualizing, hoping for, and working for a better world, is an enduring and essential part of human aspiration and political culture'.12 Likewise, Lyman Sargent has posited that utopianism is reflective of the basic human desire for 'a better life, for order, unity, and simplicity', whilst Ernst Bloch has even gone so far as to suggest that utopian desires represent a significant element of what it means to be human.13 Jay Winter too has sought to broaden the field of utopian studies by encouraging historians to pay closer attention to the ideas and visions of, what he has branded, the 'minor utopians'; a group made up of 'people who configured limited and much less sanguinary plans for partial transformation of the world'.14 The main benefit of these more holistic approaches to the concept of utopianism is that they help to prevent discussions from descending into (subjective) arguments about what is realistically viable or not and, instead, encourage scholars to think more critically about the methods through which different visions of the future are presented and to better consider what these projections can tell us about the hopes and aspirations of different social groups.
This article builds upon these ideas and develops these lines of enquiries by looking in more depth at the content, the form and the functions of the proposals that were put forward by the planning movement in the 1940s. As such, it seeks to move beyond the current 'utopia versus reality dichotomy' in the field and reintegrate the concept of utopianism back into discussions of planning in Britain in the post-war period.
A nation rebuilt
For the most part, utopian theorists agree that one of the key perquisites of any utopian vision is that it must posit and put forward some vision of the future that is, in the eyes of the creator at least, notably better than the present. For instance, according to Darko Suvin, a utopia is:
The verbal construction of a particular quasi-human community where sociopolitical institutions, norms and individual relationships are organized according to a more perfect principle than in the author's community.15
Ruth Levitas suggests something similar in her work, suggesting that the 'essence of utopia seems to be desire -the desire for a different, better way of being'. 16 Certainly, these sorts of aspirations were present in many of the reconstruction plans and proposals that were drawn up in the 1940s. Indeed, in her most recent study of council Our task is a heavy one . . . it is that of replacing an outworn civilisation . . . utopia can no longer be an unknown land on the other side of the globe; it is rather the land one knows best, re-apportioned, re-shaped, and re-cultivated for permanent human occupation. 18 Of course, one of the reasons why so much thought was being given to future reconstruction at this time was that the Blitz had reduced so many of Britain's cities to rubble. Moreover, the Blitz not only transformed the idea of 'rebuilding Britain' from a loosely defined and vaguely desirable objective into a coherent necessity, it also provided vast, flattened-out, 'socially empty' spaces in the centres of Britain's main cities upon which planners could project their visions for the future. The primary reason why those in architectural and town planning professions seem to have shown so little remorse about the damage being done was because, in their eyes at least, Britain's city centres were so outworn that they were in need of 'levelling'. As Williams-Eliis put it: 'we had left so disgracefully few [good] buildings that most of the tissue destroyed was of a morbid growth that we ought ourselves to have cut away long ago'.24 Eric de Mare´ -an influential architectural photographer and freelance writer -was similarly critical of the state of Britain's cities, declaring that 'the bombs have merely completed an already existing chaos . . . the city is planless, sunless, cramped and entirely unfitted for its purpose'.25
In place of this past formless chaos, planners envisioned creating entire new, more satisfactory cityscapes that would be better planned. As Gordon Cherry notes, there was a 'determination for change and for meeting the future with a resolve to sweep away the past'.26
For instance, Herbert Manzoni -Birmingham's City Surveyor and Engineer from 1935 to 1963 -stated that if the cities of the future were to provide 'a fuller and more purposeful life after the war' then 'every single building' had to be 'coordinated with national and local plans'.27 Again, this desire to reconstruct and plan on a large scale is something that is very much characteristic of utopian thought. Indeed, as Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out, most utopias -whether they were fictional or not -tend to be territorially defined in the sense that they are self-contained and complete constructs.28 Frederic Jameson has argued something similar, suggesting that it is precisely this category of 'totality' that presides over all forms of utopian realization, citing 'the Utopian city, the Utopian revolution, the Utopian commune or village, and of course the Utopian text itself' as examples of this 'totalizing impulse'.29
Nevertheless, despite the bold rhetoric used, it is important not to overlook the fact that most planners tended to remain very much grounded in terms of their goals and aspirations. As You've only got to look at where we went wrong in the past to see that that it was always because we thought of one important thing and forgot others . . . after the last war we thought almost solely of a good family life and forgot about industry and community life. 37 Mumford too felt that planners had not given enough attention to social factors during the interwar period, claiming that they had been 'too concerned with a set of narrow physical, technical and economic questions' and had conceived planning 'in a purely mechanical fashion . . . not social and personal terms'.38 Particular criticism was directed at the lack of social and communal facilities that had been provided on most suburban housing schemes. As Patrick Abercrombie put it, 'the relationship between housing and community was almost entirely ignored . . . the lack of focal points for the new community life became tragically evident'.39 Thomas Sharp expressed similar reservations, declaring that 'the problem of providing a great number of urgently needed homes was solved -but solved without regard to making well-balanced communities'.40 Visually, however, the Lansbury Estate was fairly conservative, providing visitors with a far more sombre glimpse into the future than that provided on the brazenly modernist South Bank Site. Costs were kept to a minimum and most of the buildings were constructed using yellow London stock bricks so that they fitted in with the surrounding area.68 As a result, the glimpse of what it would really be like to live on a council estate. As W.S. Crawford, the public relations officer for the site, explained: 'the aim [is] to demonstrate in life-size and in permanent form . . . how a typical Lansbury family can achieve pleasant home conditions within the budget at its disposal'.73 Indeed, so keen were the Exhibition's designers to make the 'Show House' as realistic as possible that they even conjured up a fictional family to inhabit the show home: the father (Bill) was imagined to be a 40-year-old dockworker on a wage of £10-12 a week, who, having apparently served with the Navy during the war, was keen to 'see everything shipshape and Bristol fashion'; his wife (Mary) was 35 years old, had worked in the services during the war and 'understood good housekeeping'; and their four children (Jack, Jane, Jill and Baby Tom) were 13, 8, 6 and 1 years old, respectively.74
In many ways, then, the Live Architecture Exhibition was the perfect symbol of the planning profession's 'utopian' aspirations in this period. Functionally, it was clearly utopian in the sense that it was a physical embodiment of an alternate future that could be viewed and assessed by members of the public. Likewise, the manner in which the Exhibition's organizers actively sought to dislocate visitors from their present-day milieu and transport them through a carefully choreographed public spectacle can also be seen to have distinctly utopian traits. Nevertheless, the Live Architecture Exhibition did not present visitors with anything like the same sort of fantastical and ultramodern visions that were on display at the South Bank Site. Instead, visitors to Lansbury were treated to a much more utilitarian and functional spectacle where the emphasis was much more on providing practical and workable solutions to the planning issues of the present; a utopianism that was, once again, heavily pragmatic at its core.
A vision worth fighting for
As a number of utopian theorists have stressed, one of the things that distinguishes utopian writing from pure fantasy is the fact that, very often, utopias have a functional role in the sense that they are produced in response to problems and issues that have arisen in the author's present. Thus, according to Frederic Jameson: a utopia must be motivated: it must respond to specific dilemmas and offer to solve fundamental social problems to which the Utopian believes himself to hold the key . . . and this must be a solution so obvious and self-explanatory that every reasonable person will grasp it'.75 Krishan Kumar has made a similar point in his writings on the topic, suggesting that utopias typically seek to engage with the present:
From the very beginning, from More's own rational and restrained vision in his Utopia, utopia has displayed a certain sobriety, a certain wish to walk in step with current realities. It is as if it has wanted deliberately to distance itself from the wilder fancies of the popular imagination . . . it has wanted to remain within the realm of the possible -possible according to the human and social materials to hand . . . it accepts the psychological and sociological realities of human society.76
As mentioned previously, this desire to provide workable solutions to the problems of the present was something that was very much evident in the reconstruction proposals advocated by the planning professions during the 1940s. Dealing with the housing crisis facing Britain at this time and restoring a sense of community to inner-city areas were two of the most pressing issues that the planning professions sought to provide solutions to, but there were many other contemporary concerns that similarly worried planners in this period. Chief among these was the falling birth rate of the period, which sparked fears about the effects that a declining and ageing population might have on Britain's military and industrial strength.77
Many planners were convinced that through better foresight in planning this potential crisis could be averted, with one speaker at the Town and Country Planning Association's National Conference in 1943 declaring that 'any policy designed to restore the birth-rate must include the provision for British families of dwellings and towns suitable for children and favourable to family life'. 78 Mumford too was insistent on this point, stating that:
[W]e must think not simply in terms of industrial rehabilitation but of biological survival ... the first consideration of town planning must be to provide an environment which will not be hostile to biological survival [but] to create one which . . . by sympathetic magic will encourage the woman of child bearing age the impulse to bear.79
Yet alongside the fact that they offered potentially workable solutions to the problems of the present, there was also a sense amongst many planners that the reconstruction proposals of the 1940s fulfilled a number of other publically beneficial roles simply by virtue of the fact that, structurally, they provided visions of different futures and other possible worlds. In particular, there seems to have been an awareness that the schemes outlined in the reconstruction proposals could, and frequently did, provide some much needed optimism and positivity to a war-weary population. Closely tied in with this desire to be seen to be promoting democracy, then, was an acute awareness of the need to be seen to be acting in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the general public. As Osborn noted: 'You can't leave it to the experts. We shall never get good planning except on a democratic basis. Planning always goes wrong if people plan for others'.86 As such, it was increasingly accepted that planners had an obligation to help educate the public, as one speaker at the 1944 Town and Country Planning Association's National Conference noted: 'it is our duty to educate and instruct the public so that they can appreciate now the possibilities and effects of planning legislations'.87 Ralph Tubbs, the man responsible for the design of the iconic 'Dome of Discovery' at the 1951 Festival of Britain, was of a similar mind-set: '[we] must help the public realise the opportunities and grasp the implications of reconstruction [and] bring to their notice those human values and aspirations that can be embodied in a well-planned country'.88
From a practical perspective, the reconstruction plans and proposals put forward in this period played a crucial role in this respect as they were able bring the visions that planners had for the future to life in an immediate and accessible way. At the Live Architecture Exhibition, for instance, the organizers erected a large red and white striped 'Town Planning Pavilion' -replete with images and models of future planning schemes -so as to educate the public about the principles of good town planning. An equally large 'Building Research Pavilion', in which there was a specially designed 'Gremlin Grange' that demonstrated through a series of full-size models all the things that could go wrong in buildings when scientific principles were not adhered to, was also erected on the site. 89 The LCC were similarly keen to educate the public about the principles of town planning and in 1944 they produced a special edition of the County of London Plan for use in schools, informing pupils that It would be an excellent thing if you and the other members of your class undertook a cooperative attempt at making a Plan for your own neighbourhood .
. . it is extremely important that you should begin to take an informed interest in the affairs of your own district, because good citizenship begins at home. If you are a good citizen of your own neighbourhood you are more likely to become a good citizen of London, of Britain and of the world as a whole.90
As this section has indicated, therefore, the reconstruction plans and proposals of the 1940s were, despite their utopian tone and content, very much grounded in the realities of the period. Not only did they attempt to provide solutions to the problems and issues of the day; they also tried to make a positive and direct impact on people's lives by providing positive and informative visions that contrasted drastically with the grim realities of wartime Britain.
Moreover, as Nick Bullock has noted, debates over reconstruction not only encouraged members of the public to 'think actively and constructively' about the future; they also proved to be significant in encouraging local authorities, like the LCC, to experiment and innovate during the 1940s. 91 In other words, then, the reconstruction proposals put forwards by planners in the post-war period were, thanks in no small part to their idealistic rhetoric, very much of relevance to the day-to-day functioning of British society in the 1940s; suggesting once again that this was a utopianism that was, at its core, simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic.
Conclusion
For too long, debates over planning in post-war Britain have revolved around a narrowly conceived 'utopia versus reality' dichotomy: on one side have been those who have sought to portray the 1940s as a period in which planners became caught up in naive and impractical fantasies about the future; on the other have been those who have, in response to these claims and in an effort to underplay the idealism of the planning professions, strongly emphasizing the pragmatism and ordinariness of these plans. This has led to a slightly farcical situation whereby planners from this period can either be presented as deluded, aloof dreamers or as hard-headed rationalists with little thought for the future. This paper has endeavoured to tell a different story. Rather than treating utopianism and pragmatism as two mutually exclusive concepts, it has built upon recent work by utopian theorists and adopted a more nuanced and holistic approach to the concept of 'utopia'; looking at the content, the form and the function of the reconstruction proposals of the postwar period. In short, it has tried to move beyond the misguided notion that just because something is utopian it must therefore be inherently naive, impossible or misguided. Instead, it has shown that more often than not the visions for reconstruction that were put forward by the planning professions in books and public exhibitions during the post-war period were simultaneously both idealistic and pragmatic. Indeed, they not only combined a clear sense of optimism with an acute awareness of the grim realities of wartime Britain; they also sought to pragmatically use this idealism to positively impact upon public morale and to provide solutions to the problems of the day. It is, I would argue, because of these reasons that it is both necessary and desirable to reintegrate the concept of 'utopianism' back into debates over planning and reconstruction in the post-war period.
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